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ABSTRACT
Many churches are concerned about older and dwindling congregations. We develop a theoretical
framework to explain not only the downward trend in church attendance, but also the increase in
the proportion of older people in the congregations. Religiosity depends positively on the expected
social and spiritual benefits attached to religious adherence, as well as the probability of entering
heaven in the afterlife. While otherworldly compensation in terms of salvation and spiritual
benefits motivates religiosity, the costs of formal religion in terms of time allocated to communal
activities and foregone income work in the opposite direction. We show that higher life expectancy
discounts expected benefits in the afterlife and is hence likely to lead to postponement of
religiosity. For this reason, religious organizations should be prepared to attract older members to
their congregations, while emphasizing contemporaneous religious benefits to increase overall
church attendance.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Many religious establishments have reported a steep decline in outward religious expression
and participation in recent years. According to the latest estimates of the World Values
Survey Dataset (2009)1, the percentage of those who regularly attend religious services has
fallen below 5% in countries such as Sweden, Norway and Estonia. A recent report on church
attendance in the UK by the development NGO Tearfund (2007) suggests that only 15% of
the population attend church services at least monthly. Moreover, church attendance appears
to be more prevalent amongst older people. The share of regular church attendants in the UK
is 26% for those above the age of 65 compared to 11% for those between the age of 16 and 44
(Christian Society, 2008). These figures confirm earlier findings by Smith (1993) on declining
church participation and youth membership in Scotland.
However, religiosity is neither low nor on the decline everywhere. Tearfund (2007)
reports that membership in Pentecostal churches in the UK has tripled since 1980. Regular
church attendance remains very high in countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and El Salvador,
where the percentage of the population who are at least monthly church goers is 95, 91 and
69% respectively (World Values Survey Dataset, 2009).
In recent years, there has been an expanding empirical literature on the determinants of
religiosity, exploring cross-country differences in church attendance (see Barro and
McCleary, 2003, 2006; McCleary and Barro, 2006). Several studies have demonstrated that
GDP per capita, government regulation of the ‘religion market’ and communist suppression
are negative determinants of religiosity, while religious pluralism works in the opposite
direction. The negative impact of income per capita is in accordance with the rational choice
1 The World Value Survey is carried out by a global academic network of social scientists, surveying the basic
values and beliefs of the public in different societies and provides international data on religiosity for a large
number of countries.
3theory of religiosity of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), where religious participation is a time-
intensive activity that sacrifices income. Hence, the opportunity cost of religious participation
increases with real wages. The negative association between religiosity and government
regulation, as well as the corresponding positive correlation with pluralism, confirm the
‘religion market’ model by Iannaccone (1991) and Iannaccone and Stark (1994). Their
theoretical model predicts that excessive government regulation inhibits competition amongst
suppliers of religious services, negatively affecting the quality of their product and religious
participation. Barro and McCleary (2003) also confirm that the anti-religion policies of former
communist governments still have an enduring impact on religiosity.
In our paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature by exploring the role of life
expectancy as an additional determinant of religiosity. Barro and McCleary (2003) find life
expectancy to be negatively correlated with religious attendance but pay little attention to the
theoretical underpinnings behind the relationship. We believe that much more can be said
about the relationship between life expectancy and religiosity, particularly with respect to the
time dimension of expected payoffs. Many people hold the view that there is a link between
religiosity and the probability of salvation (or more broadly any afterlife benefits). A poll by
Newsweek (2002) revealed that an astounding 75% of respondents believed that their actions
on earth determined their access to heaven. In many societies, there is a general belief that
entrance to heaven is conditional (to some extent) on cumulative religious effort and good
conduct during one’s lifetime (see Flynn, 2005).
We analyse religiosity through a theoretical decision-making framework, where an
individual can choose to be religious when young or defer the decision till s/he is old. The
analysis separately examines the decision-making problem of young and old individuals with
respect to religious participation and confirms the role of life expectancy in postponing
religiosity. Demand for religiosity is determined by the relative benefits and costs of religious
4adherence when alive and in the afterlife. A merit of our analysis lies in studying religiosity
through a cost-benefit framework, where decisions at each point in time depend on expected
social and spiritual benefits attached to religious adherence, the probability of entering heaven
in the afterlife, as well as the costs of formal religion in terms of time allocated to religious
activities. In this respect, a higher life expectancy discounts more heavily any expected
benefits and costs in the afterlife and is hence likely to lead to postponement of religiosity and
ageing congregations.2 For the same reason, any contemporaneous benefits linked to religious
participation (e.g. in the form of expanding a person’s social circle, communal activities,
spiritual fulfilment, support and guidance) are likely to weigh more heavily in the decision
making process compared to what might happen in the less certain and far distant afterlife.
According to our analysis, religious organizations should be hence prepared to attract
older members to the congregations, since individuals are likely to postpone the decision of
religiosity when life expectancy is high. While many religious organisations place particular
emphasis on increasing youth membership, they should not lose sight of incentives needed to
attract older people. As part of a successful strategy to increase overall attendance, religious
establishments should aim at reducing any discomfort of entry to religious newcomers, both
old and young. In light of rising life expectancy, it is important to emphasise
contemporaneous socio-spiritual benefits, rather than uncertain rewards in the afterlife. Our
theoretical findings are complemented by a cross-sectional empirical analysis, pointing to a
significantly negative impact of life expectancy on religiosity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section is devoted to the key
elements and assumptions of our theoretical framework. In Section 3, we analyze the decision
2 Our analysis is in that respect a discrete-time extension of the Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) model. In our
framework, emphasis is placed on life expectancy as a determinant of the timing of religiosity (rather than its
quantitative aspects). Contrary to Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), expected afterlife benefits are dependent on life
expectancy and we hence analyze decision-making in different intervals of the life-cycle.
5making of the young and the old, followed by a discussion of the key findings in Section 4. In
Section 5, we complement our theoretical analysis with supporting empirical evidence on the
nexus between life expectancy and religiosity. Section 6 concludes.
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION
Our analysis makes use of a 3-period model of discrete time, where each individual lives for
up to two periods (each representing the young and old intervals of one’s lifetime), with the
third period representing one’s life after death (i.e. afterlife). Periods tb1 and tb2 refer to the
young and old period of an individual’s life-cycle respectively, while period ta denotes
afterlife. Individuals make decisions in tb1 and tb2 about if and when to become religious by
weighing the anticipated costs and benefits of religious adherence when alive and in the
afterlife.
2.1. Life Expectancy and Discount Factors
Life expectancy is captured in the model by the succession probability λ from the young to the
old phase of one’s life-cycle. Hence, 1–λ denotes the probability of dying during tb1, while
still young.
We assume that individuals place greater weight on earlier periods of consumption
(both tangible and intangible) than later ones. We first assume there is a strictly positive rate
δb (0<δb<1) that discounts expected utility from the second interval of one’s life-cycle (tb2,
when old) – relative to the first period (tb1, when young). Similarly, we assume a strictly
positive factor δa (0<δa<1), that discounts expected utility in the afterlife (ta) relative to the
6preceding period of one’s lifetime (either tb1 or tb2, depending on whether life expectancy
permits succession from the young to the old phase of one’s life-cycle).3
2.2. Worldly Costs and Benefits
We assume that, on average, an old individual’s earning power is lower compared to a young
counterpart (e.g. see Philip and Gilbert, 2007 for related evidence and discussion). A young
individual, hence, derives utility W from income-generating activities, while an old individual
enjoys a proportion σ of W during the same period (where 0<σ<1). Furthermore, there is an
indirect opportunity cost of religious adherence, which comes in the form of foregone income
(see Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975). Religious participation is a time-intensive process, reducing
hence time allocated to income-earning activities. Therefore, in our model, religiosity reduces
the income derived utility of an individual by a proportion γ, where 0<γ<1. For this reason,
the opportunity cost of religiosity increases with W. This is in line with the negative
correlation between religious participation and GDP per capita levels found in empirical
studies (see McLeary and Barro, 2006).
The model takes into consideration that religious participation involves
contemporaneous benefits beyond the aforementioned payoffs anticipated in the afterlife,
denoted by B. We assume that religiosity generates contemporaneous benefits for each
religious believer, which come in the form of spiritual benefits (i.e. spiritual fulfilment,
strength, comfort, guidance) and social benefits (i.e. enlargement of social circle, participation
in social activities, social status and acceptance). We assume that these are net benefits
adjusted for any non-monetary costs of discomfort of religious participation (allowing hence
for the possibility of a negative sign). In times and countries where religious adherents are
3 One may also assume that δa=δb, with no implications for the model’s key findings.
7either prosecuted or socially marginalised (e.g. in the early Christian church), these costs are
particularly high (see Bruce, 1993 for a discussion). These may also be associated with the
unpleasantness of entering an unfamiliar environment or the cost of gathering information
about religious organisations, particularly in countries with a free religious market and limited
government regulation – such as the US – with a variety of competing religious “products”
(see Finke and Stark, 1992; Finke and Iannaconne, 1993).4
2.3. Heaven and Hell
Otherworldly compensation in terms of salvation (or damnation if unsuccessful) motivates
religious behaviour. Individual perceptions on the existence of heaven and hell in the afterlife
and related payoffs will hence influence decisions on religiosity5. We assume that an agent,
who believes in the existence of heaven and hell, derives utility H from entering heaven, and
disutility F from hell.
We attach a probability p to the existence of heaven/hell, reflecting the individual’s
beliefs on the issue (where 0≤p≤1)6. This suggests that irrespective of one’s religiosity,
individuals expect to derive zero utility after death with (1–p) probability. Personal beliefs in
the existence of heaven and hell vary enormously across countries. According to the World
4 It is possible to assume that any contemporaneous benefits of religiosity depend positively on γ without loss of
generality.
5 Although Buddhism and Hinduism do not acknowledge heaven and hell in the Judeo-Christian theological
tradition, adherents believe in being “reincarnated into heavenly intermediate stages” dependent on their
behaviour when alive (Barro and McLeary, 2007).
6 The probability attached to the existence of heaven and hell does not need to be identical, although generally
the two are highly correlated (World Value Survey Dataset, 2009).
8Value Survey Dataset (2009), only 17% of respondents acknowledged belief in heaven in
Vietnam, compared to approximately 100% in Jordan and Pakistan7.
In many religions, the perceived probability of entering heaven or hell depends to a
certain degree on the individual’s lifetime behaviour. Religious doctrines define the nature of
salvific merit; i.e. the effect of cumulative human effort on the probability of attaining
salvation or damnation. The degree of salvific merit varies across religions, being relatively
high in Buddhism and Catholicism, but lower in Protestantism where salvation/damnation is
largely seen as predestined. Particularly in religions and denominations of high salvific merit
(e.g. Pentecostals within Protestantism), engagement in non-productive religious activities
(such as attending religious services, prayers, faith teaching), is important for salvation (see
McLeary, 2007 for a detailed exposition). While hard work is generally encouraged by all
major religions (particularly across the Protestant denominations), all religions promote to
some degree charitable acts and devotion of time and financial aid for community support.
Our model captures this variation in salvific merit across different religions. We
assume that the probability of entering heaven (given personal beliefs on its existence) is π
(0≤π≤1) if an individual’s religiosity extends to both periods tb1 and tb2. The probability
reduces to απ if religiosity is postponed to period tb2, where 0≤α≤1. The dependence of
salvation on cumulative effort rather than instantaneous experiences is particularly embedded
in Pentecostalism8. On the contrary, other Protestant branches place less emphasis on the
7 There are also within-country differences in the extent of beliefs in heaven/hell across different
religions/denominations (for a US-based survey, see Exline, 2003).
8 One may assume that the probability of entering heaven, π, depends on γ (the share of time allocated to
religious activities). We avoid this assumption, as this would allow an inter-temporal substitutability of
religiosity; i.e. one might decide to be more religious when old and hence compensate for limited religiosity
when young. In our model the emphasis is given to the timing of decision-making (young vs. old) rather than to
the amount of effort devoted to religious activities through the whole life-cycle.
9duration and cumulative effort in religiosity as determinants of the outcome in afterlife (i.e. α
is close to 1).
We also allow for a positive probability of entering heaven even when an individual
refrains from being religious during the whole life-cycle (reflecting hence the fact that
salvation may be a spiritual gift from God rather than strictly determined by personal
behaviour). The probability attached to entering heaven without being religious in any period
of one’s lifetime is given by επ (where 0≤ε<α). The higher the degree of salvific merit (as it
is the case for Buddhism and Catholicism), the larger is expected to be the perceived
difference in the salvation probabilities attached to prior religious behaviour (i.e. the
difference between π and απ or απ and επ).
The model also takes into consideration that individuals, who decide to be religious in
the first period of their life cycle, tb1, may decide to discontinue religious practicing in the
second period of their life cycle, tb2. We assign a probability βπ of entering heaven to such de-
churched individuals (back-sliders in Christian jargon). Since back-sliding is largely
disapproved by most religious establishments, we assume that 0≤β<ε , to capture that a back-
slider’s probability of entering heaven cannot exceed that of someone who either becomes
religious in tb2 alone (i.e β<α) or consistently remains non-religious (i.e. β<ε)9.
2.4. The Decision Problem
We analyse religiosity through a theoretical decision-making framework, where individuals
choose if and when to be religious. They can hence decide to be either religious or non-
9 “If they have escaped the corruption of the world by knowing our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and are again
entangled in it and overcome, they are worse off at the end than they were at the beginning. It would have been
better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than to have known it and then to turn their backs on
the sacred command that was passed on to them” (Peter 2:20, Holy Bible).
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religious in the first and second period of their life cycle. We analyse separately the decision-
making process of the young and the old. Figure 1 depicts the decision making process for the
two periods of an individual’s lifecycle.
Figure 1. Decision Tree
Each young individual decides at the beginning of tb1 whether to be religious or defer
the decision, weighing the relative costs and benefits of religiosity. We assume, for simplicity,
that individuals can only reverse their initial decision on religiosity at the beginning of tb2 but
not during the tb1 or tb2 intervals.
The old individual’s decision in tb2 depends on her/his earlier decision in tb1. If the
prior decision had been to be religious, s/he will now need to decide whether to continue with
it or back-slide (become dechurched). If the decision in tb1 had been to defer religious
YOUNG
tb1
OLD
tb2
POSTPONE
RELIGIOUS
UNCHURCHED
RELIGIOUS
RELIGIOUS
DECHURCHED
AFTERLIFE
ta
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participation, s/he will need to decide whether to become religious in tb2 or continue to abstain
(remain consistently unchurched throughout the whole lifecycle).
3. DECISION ANALYSIS
In this section we examine how individuals make decisions on religiosity in the first and
second period of their life cycle. We begin by analysing the old individual’s decision in tb2.
This will help formulate how a young individual makes the decision on religiosity in tb1,
taking into account his/her likely religious behaviour when old. We assume there is perfect
information about all parameters introduced in Section 2 and hence that young individuals can
forecast religious behaviour in tb2.
3.1. Decision-making by the Old
The decision-making problem faced by old individuals in tb2 is as follows. Individuals, who
had either become religious or postponed religiosity in tb1 (when young), now revisit their
decision on religious adherence. They weigh the expected benefits and costs of religiosity in
tb2 and the afterlife, given their prior decision on religiosity in tb1.
We first analyse the decision-making problem of those old individuals, who had
previously postponed religious involvement and chose to be non-religious in tb1. An old
individual will hence abstain from religious activities, when the net utility of avoiding
religiosity exceeds the net utility of religious involvement, as suggested by inequality (1).
[(1–γ)σW+B] + δap[απH–(1–απ)F]< σW + δap[επH–(1–επ)F]. (1)
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The left-hand-side of the inequality gives the expected net utility of reversing the
earlier decision on religiosity when young and joining a religious organization when old. The
first component, [(1–γ)σW+B] , relates to utility derived from net income adjusted for the
opportunity cost of being religious, the net social and spiritual benefits of religiosity and the
reduced earning capacity in tb2. The second term δap[απH–(1–απ)F] captures otherworldly
net benefits in the afterlife, where the probability of entering heaven is απ, reflecting reduced
cumulative effort on achieving salvation (due to earlier religious abstention). These benefits
are weighted by p, the probability one attaches to the existence of heaven/hell and discounted
by δa, since the present value of afterlife benefits need to be calculated with respect to the
second period of one’s life-cycle, tb2.
The right-hand side captures expected utility under continued religious abstention. The
first component σW captures income-derived utility, while the second term δap[επH–(1–
επ)F] refers to the discounted net benefits in the afterlife, with the probability of entering
heaven equal to επ , given religious abstention during the whole life-cycle. Inequality (1) can
be reduced to,
B + Ψ(α–ε)  < σγW, (2)
                                    where Ψ = δapπ(H+F).
We now turn to the second case, where individuals who had decided to be religious in
tb1 revisit their decision at the beginning of tb2. They now have to decide whether to remain
religious or back-slide (i.e. become dechurched). In this case, the second term of inequality
(1) on the left hand side adjusts to δap[πH–(1–π)F], reflecting continuous religiosity in both
periods of the life-cycle and hence increased probability of entering heaven. Instead, a
reversal of religiosity between tb1 and tb2 (i.e. a young person becoming de-churched when
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old) reduces the probability of entering heaven in the afterlife to βπ on the right hand side of
inequality (3). In this case, an initially religious individual decides to become de-churched at
tb2 if the following inequality holds.
[(1–γ)σW+B] + δap[πH–(1–π)F] < σW + δap[βπH–(1–βπ)F], (3)
which is then reduced to,
B + Ψ(1–β)  < σγW. (4)
Figure 2 summarises the decisions of old individuals according to inequalities (2) and
(4) for different income ranges. The choice to be religious or non-religious at each time
interval is denoted by R and N respectively. We use a two letter combination to indicate
decisions over time with the first letter in parenthesis corresponding to decisions in tb1, and the
second letter to tb2.
Figure 2. Income and Decision-Making for the Old
W

 )( B

 )1( B0
Region I
(N)R
(R)R
Region II
(N)N
(R)R
Region III
(N)N
(R)N
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For sufficiently low levels of income (i.e. below [B+Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ), all individuals
will be religious irrespective of their prior decision when young (Region I). Region III
illustrates that for sufficiently high levels of income, where W>[B+Ψ(1–β)]/σγ , individuals
who had chosen to be religious when young, will reverse their decision and become
dechurched. This reflects the higher opportunity cost of religiosity due to sacrificing higher
levels of income. For income levels larger than [B+Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ (i.e. Regions II and III),
those individuals who had chosen to be non-religious when young, will remain so when old
(these are the unchurched individuals of Figure 1). This threshold income level is lower than
[B+Ψ(1–β)]/σγ , since initially non-churched individuals have a lower probability of
entering heaven by becoming religious in the second period of their life-cycle compared to
those who have been previously religious, and can hence be more easily enticed to give up
religiosity for the sake of higher income10.
An increase in socio-spiritual benefits, B, will reduce religious abstention by the old,
as can be seen from inequalities (2) and (4); in effect, by expanding region I at the expense of
region III in Figure 2. Increased socio-spiritual benefits and/or equivalently a reduction in the
discomfort of entry for newcomers render higher levels of income necessary for individuals to
abstain from religious participation. A decrease in α and β (or an increase in ε) will have the
opposite effect by delinking entry to heaven with prior religious involvement.
3.2. Decision-making by the Young
In this sub-section we analyse the decision-making problem of individuals who are at the first
period of the life-cycle, tb1. A young individual compares the expected benefits and costs of
10 It can easily be seen that B+Ψ(α–ε ) ] /σγ  < B+Ψ(1–β) ] /σγ , because α–ε<1–β→ β–ε<1–α . This
always holds since 0<β<ε<α .
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becoming religious without delay against deferring the decision until later, in tb2. We begin by
presenting the expected payoffs of a young person under the four possible scenarios outlined
in Figure 1. The choice to be religious or non-religious at each time interval is again denoted
by R and N respectively and we use the two letter combination to indicate decisions over time,
with the first letter corresponding to decisions in tb1 and the second in parenthesis to tb2.
Scenario N(R): Postpone decision (not religious in tb1) and become religious in tb2.
The payoff to an individual in this scenario is given by expression (5).
W + λδb[(1–γ)σW+B]  + λδbδap[απH–(1–απ)F]+ (1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F]. (5)
The first term W captures income-derived utility in tb1, while the second component
λδb[(1–γ)σW+B] relates to utility from income in tb2 (adjusted for the costs and benefits of
religiosity) when the older individual joins a religious establishment, weighted by the survival
probability λ to the second period of one’s life-cycle. The third term, λδbδap[απH–(1–
απ)F], captures otherworldly net benefits in the afterlife, assuming survival to tb2 with
probability λ, where the probability of entering heaven is equal to απ, reflecting reduced
cumulative effort on achieving salvation (note that the benefits have also been weighted by p,
which is the probability one attaches to the existence of heaven/hell)11. The last component,
(1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F], relates to utility from heaven/hell if one dies at the end of tb1 (and
is hence discounted by δa alone) without having the opportunity to become religious when
old. In this case, the probability of entering heaven is reduced to επ, reflecting the absence of
any religious effort.
11 Notice, that both discount factors δa and δb are used, since the present value of afterlife net benefits need to be
calculated with respect to tb1.
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Scenario N(N): Postpone decision (not religious in tb1) and remain unchurched in tb2.
The expected payoff of consistent religious abstention throughout the whole life-cycle is,
     W + λδbσW + λδbδap[επH–(1–επ)F]+ (1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F]. (6)
Note that the first and last terms of expression (5) reappear in expression (6). This is
because in both cases the individual chooses to be not religious in tb1, and hence income
derived utility in tb1 and expected payoffs in the after life, ta, in case of no succession to tb2
will remain unchanged. Income derived utility in tb2 is given by the second term λδbσW,
capturing the decision to remain unchurched in tb2. The third term, the expected payoff in the
afterlife assuming succession to the second phase of the life-cycle, now adjusts to
λδbδap[επH–(1–επ)F] , taking into account a reduced probability of entering heaven, επ ,
since the individual remains non-religious in both periods.
Scenario R(R): Be religious in tb1 and remain religious in tb2.
The expected payoff from continuous religiosity is given by expression (7).
[(1–γ)W+ B]  + λδb[(1–γ)σW+ B]  + λδbδap[πH–(1–π)F]
+ (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F]. (7)
The first component [(1–γ)W+B] relates to utility derived from net income in tb1,
adjusted for the costs of being religious, as well as the net social and spiritual benefits of
religiosity. The second term λδb[(1–γ)σW+ B] captures the same net benefits for the second
17
period of one’s lifetime (when old), discounted by δb and weighted by the succession
probability λ from the young to the old phase of one’s life-cycle. The third term, λδbδap[πH–
(1–π)F], is the discounted expected utility in the afterlife, assuming a succession probability
λ to tb2 and the highest probability of entering heaven π due to continuous religiosity. The last
term, (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F], captures the net utility from heaven/hell if low life
expectancy prevents succession to the older phase of the life-cycle tb2. The probability of
entering heaven is again equal to π reflecting prior engagement in religious activities.
Scenario R(N): Be religious in tb1 and become dechurched in tb2.
The payoff from discontinued religiosity is given by expression (8). Note that the first and last
terms are the same as in expression (7). In both scenarios, the individual chooses to be
religious in tb1, and hence income derived utility in tb1 and expected payoffs in the afterlife, ta,
in case of no succession to tb2 remain the same. The second term captures income derived
utility in tb2 in case of no religiosity. The third term, that captures afterlife benefits assuming
succession to tb2, adjusts to λδbδap[βπH–(1–πβ)F], reflecting the lowest probability of
entering heaven of a dechurched individual, βπ .
[(1–γ)W+ B]  + λδbσW + λδbδap[βπH–(1–βπ)F+ (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F]. (8)
Now we can analyse a young individual’s decision making process, especially to
understand the impact of life expectancy. A young individual weighs the expected benefits
and costs of religiosity during the two periods of his/her life-cycle and the afterlife and
decides whether to become involved in religious activities in tb1 or defer religiosity till tb2.
When making this decision, s/he has to take into consideration his/her future decision-making
options in tb2 when s/he is old. Below, we analyse the possible scenarios young individuals are
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confronted with in tb1, and examine how increases in life expectancy (captured by λ)
encourage postponement of religiosity.
We draw attention to Figure 2. Those individuals who fall into Region I will have to
compare N(R) and R(R) to decide whether to postpone or not. Likewise those in Region II will
compare N(N) with R(R), while those in Region III will compare N(N) and R(N).
A young individual in Region I (i.e. if W<[B+ Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ), will compare the net
expected utility of postponing religiosity in tb1 with an intention to become religious in tb2 –
scenario N(R) – with that of immediate and continuous religious involvement throughout the
lifecycle – scenario R(R). Such an individual will hence decide to postpone religiosity if the
net benefits of scenario N(R) exceed those of scenario R(R), as in inequality (9).
[(1–γ)W+B]  + λδb[(1–γ)σW+B]  + λδbδap[πH–(1–π)F] + (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F]
< (9)
W + λδb[(1–γ)σW+B]  + λδbδap[απH–(1–απ)F] + (1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F].
With some rearrangement, inequality (9) reduces to
B + Ψ[λδb(1–α)+(1–λ)(1–ε)] <  γW. (10)
The left-hand-side of inequality (10) is strictly decreasing in life expectancy, λ , since
the first derivative of the expression with respect to λ is negative.12 The postponement
condition (10) holds more easily for lower values of λ , suggesting that increases in life
12 The derivative of the left-hand side of expression (10) with respect to  is equal to Ψ[δ b(1–α )– (1–ε ) ] . This
expression is negative because 0<δ b<1 and α>ε  1–α<1–ε  δ b(1–α )<1–ε .
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expectancy encourage postponement of religious involvement (in effect by discounting
expected benefits in the afterlife).
A young individual in Region II (i.e. when [B+Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ < W< [B+Ψ(1–β)]/σγ)
compares the net expected utility of remaining unchurched during the whole life-cycle –
scenario N(N) – with that of immediate and continuous religious involvement – scenario R(R).
The individual will hence decide to postpone religiosity if the net benefits of scenario N(N)
exceed those of scenario R(R), as in inequality (11).
[(1–γ)W+B]  + λδb[(1–γ)σW+B]  + λδbδap[πH–(1–π)F]
+ (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F]
< (11)
W + λδbσW + λδbδap[επH–(1–επ)F]
+ (1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F],
which reduces to,
(1+ λδb)B + Ψ(1–ε)[1–λ(1–δb)]  – γ(1+ λδbσ)W < 0. (12)
Again, an increase in life expectancy, captured by λ, makes the postponement 
condition, given by inequality (12), easier to hold.13
13 One can prove that the left-hand-side of (12) is strictly decreasing in λ . The first derivative with respect to λ is
negative when W > [δ b B –  Ψ(1–ε ) (1–δ b) ] /γδ bσ . In Region II, it also needs to hold that [B + Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ < W
< [B + Ψ(1–β)]/σγ. For this income range, the first derivative of the left-hand-side of expression (12) is always
negative since [δ b B –  Ψ(1–ε ) (1–δ b) ] /γδ bσ < [B + Ψ(α–ε)]/σγ  – (1– ε)(1– δb) < (α–ε) δb, which always
holds, since α>ε .
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A young individual in Region III will compare the net expected utility of remaining
unchurched during the whole life-cycle – scenario N(N) – with that of immediate religious
involvement in period tb1 and backsliding in tb2 – scenario R(N). S/he will hence decide to
postpone religiosity if the net benefits of scenario N(N) exceed those of scenario R(N), as
indicated by inequality (13).
[(1–γ)W+B]  + λδbσW + λδbδap[βπH–(1–βπ)F] + (1–λ)δap[πH–(1–π)F]
< (13)
W + λδbσW + λδbδap[επH–(1–επ)F] + (1–λ)δap[επH–(1–επ)F],
which then reduces to
B + Ψ[λδb(β–ε)+(1–λ)(1–ε)] <  γW. (14)
We can show that postponement inequality (14) always holds for income Region III,
where [B+ Ψ(1–β)]/σγ < W.14 In this case, a decrease in life expectancy, λ , will simply
reinforce the postponement condition (14) – i.e. the first derivative of the left-hand-side of the
expression with respect to λ is equal to Ψ[δb(β–ε)–(1–ε)], which is negative since β<ε and
0<δb<1.
14 The income threshold for postponement under (14) is equal to {B+Ψ[λδ b(β–ε )+(1–λ) (1–ε ) ]} /γ . Hence,
the postponement condition always holds since [B+Ψ(1–β) ] /σγ > [B+Ψ(1–β) ] /γ  > {B+Ψ[λδ b(β–
ε )+(1–λ) (1–ε ) ]} /γ  or equivalently 1–β > λδ b(β–ε )+ (1–λ) (1–ε )  β (1+λδ b)> ε (1+λδ b)+λ (1–ε ) ,
which always holds since β<ε and 0<λ ,σ ,δ b ,ε<1.
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4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The decision-making inequalities for the young and the old highlight some of the key factors
underpinning overall religious participation and its age structure. We have shown that an
increase in life expectancy, λ, leads to postponement of religious participation. A higher life
expectancy heavily delays expected benefits in the afterlife and in effect discounts them in
current decision-making on religiosity. In poorer countries where life expectancy remains
low, a larger share of the population (comprising of both young and older members) is
concerned about what happens after death. This result is summarised in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in life expectancy, λ, increases postponement of religious 
participation.
An important message from the analysis is that given an increase in life expectancy,
religious establishments should be prepared to accept and expect a ‘greying church’, with a
membership composition skewed towards the older generation. Particularly for religious
doctrines that attach a small ‘penalty’ to the postponement of religiosity (value of α close to
1), individuals are more likely to decide to postpone.
In view of this anticipated continuous shift in demand for religiosity towards the old,
steps should be taken by religious establishments to facilitate access to older members of the
society, particularly since many of them will be unchurched. This may involve making
information about the organisation easily accessible to them; assisting new-comers to follow
religious activities without feeling lost or uncomfortable; improving the socio-spiritual
benefits for the old etc.
This is not to say that youth membership should be downplayed. The negative effect
of a higher life expectancy on religiosity – which in effect reduces concern about life after
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death – can be counterbalanced by using socio-spiritual benefits that can be enjoyed in the
present life time as a stimulus for the young to participate. Inequalities (10) and (12) reveal
that an increase in the contemporaneous socio-spiritual benefits B, make the postponement
condition more difficult to hold. The increase in such socio-spiritual benefits compensate for
the loss of time and income as a result of religious involvement and should be pursued by
religious establishments as a means to increase religious participation. This result is stated in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in socio-spiritual benefits, B, incentivises religious involvement,
particularly when life expectancy, λ, is high. 
Several other parameters influence religious participation. Large benefits associated
with access to heaven (and avoidance of hell) – namely H and F – will tend to stimulate
religious involvement. Similarly, a high probability attached to the existence of heaven/hell, p,
will also work in the same direction. An increased probability of entering heaven through
continuous religious involvement, π, will deter postponement of religious participation, while
a reduced probability of entering heaven through continuous religious abstention (captured by
a lower value of ε) will have the opposite effect. Furthermore, an increase in α (in effect
reducing the penalty of delayed religious participation on after-life benefits) will encourage
postponement, especially when the probability of imminent death is low.
The religious parameters in our model (i.e. p, H, F, π, ε, α , β) may be treated as
exogenous in individual decision-making, reflecting differences across religious doctrines.
However, there is room for prominent religious leaders to influence choices by placing
emphasis on the magnitude of some of these parameters.
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5. SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RELIGIOSITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY
We estimate cross-country regressions using OLS to identify the dependence of religiosity on
life expectancy in the tradition of Barro and McCleary (2006), which has largely influenced
the religion-growth literature. We make use of two dependent variables to proxy religiosity,
namely, the share of respondents who self-identify themselves as religious people (Religious
Person), and the share of respondents who attend religious services at least monthly
(Attendance) for the 1999-2003 period. In all regressions, we include life expectancy at birth
in 2000 (Life expectancy) as an explanatory variable, since the dependence of religiosity on
life expectancy is the focal point of our empirical analysis. Data on religiosity (Religious
Person, Attendance) and life expectancy are provided by the World Value Survey Dataset
(2009) and the World Bank Development Indicators (2009) respectively. A detailed
description of variables used in our empirical analysis is provided in Appendix A1.
In Table 1, we estimate the determinants of self-identification as a Religious Person,
consecutively alternating the set of explanatory regressors. In regression (1) we include life
expectancy as the sole explanatory variable of religiosity and find a very strong negative
statistical correlation between the two measures. An increase of life expectancy by 10 years
(the difference in life expectancy commonly found between Eastern and Western European
economies) is associated with an increase in self-identification as a religious person by 8.4
percentage points. This is a result of significant magnitude, particularly since differences in
life expectancy are often of a much larger scale between developed and developing nations.
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Table 1. Religiosity and Life Expectancy
Dependent variable:
Religious
Person
(1)
Religious
Person
(2)
Religious
Person
(3)
Constant 131.91 114.72 129.82
Life expectancy –0.84***
(0.17)
–1.06***
(0.35)
–0.97***
(0.35)
Catholics 0.28***(0.07)
0.26***
(0.07)
Muslims 0.30***(0.09)
0.25***
(0.08)
Income per Capita –1.91(4.31)
0.02
(0.04)
Communist State –8.94**(4.46)
R 2 adjusted 0.13 0.39 0.42
N 61 61 61
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance.
In regressions (2) and (3) we extend the set of explanatory variables and assess the
robustness of the life expectancy coefficient as well as the relevance of additional regressors.
In regression (2), we control for the share of the population adhering to the Catholic and
Muslim faith in comparison to other religions. Data on religious adherence by Catholics and
Muslims are provided by La Porta et al. (1999). We also include Income per Capita in 2000 to
control for differences in religiosity and attendance at religious services between richer and
poorer countries. Richer nations may experience a higher extent of secularisation as a whole,
as suggested by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), in which case the coefficient for income per
capita is expected to be negative. For attendance at religious services, a high level of income
per capita may well indicate an increase in leisure and time spent on communal activities,
reversing hence the causality (see Barro and McCleary, 2006 for a discussion). The sign of
dependence on income, hence, will be the subject of our empirical investigation. Data on
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income levels are provided by the Center for International Comparisons (2009), University of
Pennsylvania.
In column (3) we also incorporate a dummy variable capturing whether the country is or
has been communist since 1950 (Communism State). Barro and McCleary (2006) find that
even past communism has a long-lasting and negative impact on religiosity and attendance at
religious services. Data on communism are provided by Gallup et al. (1999). We find
adherence to Islam and Catholicism to have a strong positive impact on self-identification as
religious, while a communist present or past has the opposite effect (income effects remain
insignificant). More importantly for the scope of our analysis, the statistical significance and
magnitude of the life expectancy impact on religiosity remains largely unaffected by the
inclusion of additional explanatory factors.
In Table 2, we use the share of respondents who regularly attend religious services
(Attendance) as a proxy for religiosity and assess the robustness of the life expectancy–
religiosity linkage. Column entries (4)-(6) replicate regressions (1)-(3) of Table 1 in the
appearing sequence of explanatory variables. The sign and statistical significance of estimated
coefficients are in accord with the earlier results reported in Table 1. An increase in life
expectancy by 10 years is now associated with a rise of religious services attendance by
approximately 15-17%. As an additional robustness check, we incorporate in column entries
(7)-(9) variables that capture variation in beliefs in Heaven, Hell and God. Data on the
existence of heaven, hell and God are provided by the World Value Survey Dataset (2009)
and are based on a yes-or-no answer format of respondents.
As expected, strong beliefs in heaven, hell and God in some form are strongly and
positively correlated with religious attendance. We find similar results when the same
regressors are included as additional explanatory variables for religious self-identification in
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Table 115. This is an important result by itself. Life expectancy remains a strong negative
determinant of religiosity even after controlling for beliefs in heaven, hell and God, which are
variables that are strongly associated with attitudes towards religion.
Table 2. Church Attendance and Life Expectancy
Dependent variable:
Attendance
(4)
Attendance
(5)
Attendance
(6)
Attendance
(7)
Attendance
(8)
Attendance
(9)
Constant 153.67 147.35 178.28 108.47 90.97 109.15
Life expectancy –1.55***
(0.21)
–1.74***
(0.3)
–1.56***
(0.32)
–0.80***
(0.23)
–0.98***
(0.21)
–0.93***
(0.24)
Catholics 0.42***(0.07)
0.37***
(0.06)
0.27***
(0.05)
0.27***
(0.04)
0.25***
(0.06)
Muslims 0.29***(0.07)
0.19**
(0.06)
–0.03
(0.07)
–0.14**
(0.07)
0.03
(0.06)
Income per Capita 0.04(0.04)
–3.81
(3.58)
–5.10**
(2.31)
–1.38
(2.26)
–6.18**
(2.63)
Communist State –17.69***(4.12)
–8.48*
(4.72)
–10.73***
(3.66)
–10.49***
(3.81)
Heaven 49.07***(10.96)
Hell 57.66***
(8.19)
God 59.88***
(12.55)
R 2 adjusted 0.27 0.57 0.66 0.79 0.83 0.77
N 63 63 63 60 60 60
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to
a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance.
15 The proxies for beliefs in heaven, hell and God are not entered simultaneously, as they are highly collinear.
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6. CONCLUSION
In recent years, religious establishments have been particularly concerned about decreasing
religious expression and participation in most parts of the world. In the UK, church attendance
has been consistently on the decline in the past 50 years. Despite the dramatic decrease in
religiosity particularly in developed economies, data reveal that the pattern is far from
universal. In many sub-Saharan African and Latin American nations, in particular, religious
adherence remains strong. Recent theoretical and empirical work has attempted to attribute
these diverging patterns in religiosity to several socio-economic variables, including the level
of economic development and government regulation of the religion market.
In our paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature by exploring the mediating
role of life expectancy in explaining cross-country differences in religious expression, a
channel that has so far received little attention in the literature. Decisions on religiosity are
inextricably linked to the time dimension of religious costs and anticipated benefits. Most
religious beliefs link to some degree the cumulative amount of religious effort to benefits in
the afterlife. Increases in life expectancy, in effect, discount these after-life benefits against
the life-time costs of religious participation, which often come in the form of sacrificing time
and income. Hence, increases in life expectancy encourage postponement of religious
involvement, particularly in religion doctrines that do not necessarily link salvation (or
afterlife benefits more broadly) to the timing of religiosity.
This is an important finding for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that religious
establishments should anticipate to attract older members, particularly in countries which have
high life expectancy or expects significant increases in life expectancy (e.g. due to
improvements in medical care or decline in critical infection rates). An increased life span
allows for postponement of religiosity, without necessarily jeopardising benefits in the
afterlife, which are anyway discounted far in the future.
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Second, the analysis illustrates that emphasis placed on the provision of socio-economic
benefits that can be enjoyed during one’s lifetime on earth. The paper shows how current socio-
economic benefits can counterbalance the negative impact of life expectancy on religiosity and
hence encourage religious involvement. Religions, that largely delink salvation/damnation to the
timing and amount of religious effort, will particularly need to resort to such means to boost
membership numbers.
Appendices
A1. List of variables used in the empirical analysis
Religious Person The share of respondents that self-identified themselves as religious
people between 1999-2003. Source: World Value Survey Dataset (2009).
Attendance The share of respondents who attended religious services at least monthly
between 1999-2003. Source: World Value Survey Dataset (2009).
Life Expectancy Life Expectancy at birth in 2000. Source: World Bank Development
Indicators (2009).
Catholics Share of Catholics in total population (most data for 1990s). Source: La
Porta et al. (1999).
Muslims Share of Muslims in total population (most data for 1990s). Source: La
Porta et al. (1999).
Income per Capita The logarithm of real GDP per capita in 2000 (2000 U.S. Dollar Prices).
Source: Center for International Comparisons (2009) at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Communist State Dummy variable capturing whether the country is or has been communist
since 1950. Data provided by Gallup et al. (1999).
Heaven Share of respondents acknowledging beliefs in heaven (1999-2003
survey). Source: World Value Survey Dataset (2009).
Hell Share of respondents acknowledging beliefs in hell (1999-2003 survey).
Source: World Value Survey Dataset (2009).
God Share of respondents acknowledging beliefs in God (1999-2003 survey).
Source: World Value Survey Dataset (2009).
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A2. Data for key variables used in regression analysis
ISO Attendance ReligiousPerson
Life
Expectancy
ALGERIA DZA 0.502 0.600 70
ARGENTINA ARG 0.429 0.844 74
AUSTRIA AUT 0.425 0.795 78
BANGLADESH BGD 0.672 0.968 61
BELARUS BLR 0.144 0.275 68
BELGIUM BEL 0.271 0.681 78
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA BIH 0.452 0.744 74
BULGARIA BGR 0.203 0.517 72
CANADA CAN 0.359 0.736 79
CHILE CHL 0.454 0.708 77
CHINA CHN 0.031 0.147 70
COLOMBIA COL 0.666 0.852 71
CROATIA HRV 0.527 0.853 73
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.116 0.433 75
DENMARK DNK 0.12 0.765 77
ESTONIA EST 0.113 0.417 71
FINLAND FIN 0.141 0.667 78
FRANCE FRA 0.120 0.466 79
GERMANY DEU 0.301 0.558 78
GREECE GRC 0.335 0.797 78
HUNGARY HUN 0.175 0.59 71
ICELAND ISL 0.120 0.74 79
INDIA IND 0.512 0.795 63
INDONESIA IDN 0.755 0.845 66
IRAN IRN 0.465 0.95 69
IRELAND IRL 0.675 0.74 76
ITALY ITA 0.537 0.86 80
JAPAN JPN 0.123 0.265 81
JORDAN JOR 0.467 0.859 71
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.383 76
LATVIA LVA 0.151 0.769 70
LITHUANIA LTU 0.316 0.844 72
MALTA MLT 0.865 0.747 78
MEXICO MEX 0.747 0.774 74
MOROCCO MAR 0.480 0.946 69
NETHERLANDS NLD 0.252 0.617 78
NEW ZEALAND NZL 0.221 0.525 79
NIGERIA NGA 0.952 0.966 47
PAKISTAN PAK 0.913 0.908 63
PERU PER 0.713 0.883 69
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ISO Attendance ReligiousPerson
Life
Expectancy
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.795 0.795 70
POLAND POL 0.782 0.944 74
PORTUGAL PRT 0.513 0.881 77
ROMANIA ROM 0.464 0.848 71
RUSSIA RUS 0.092 0.657 65
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.442 0.704 71
SINGAPORE SGP 0.441 78
SLOVAKIA SVK 0.498 0.815 73
SLOVENIA SVN 0.307 0.702 76
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.684 0.789 49
SPAIN ESP 0.361 0.613 79
SWEDEN SWE 0.093 0.389 80
TANZANIA TZA 0.867 0.944 49
TURKEY TUR 0.401 0.818 70
UGANDA UGA 0.883 0.940 46
UKRAINE UKR 0.169 0.753 68
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 0.201 0.422 78
USA USA 0.602 0.826 77
VENEZUELA VEN 0.479 0.786 73
VIETNAM VNM 0.128 0.384 69
ZIMBABWE ZWE 0.810 0.886 43
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